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INTERPRETING THE UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPLICIT IN THE U.N. DECLARATIONS
Nicholas Wolterstorff
PREFACE
Among my most treasured memories are those of the meetings in which
Michael Perry and I, along with others, have commented on each other’s
writings. These have been, for me, memorable learning experiences. Time and
again, Perry has approached the issues being discussed from an angle that had
not occurred to me. That is true, once again, for the issues that I will discuss in
this Essay.1
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1
I have learned that the editors of the Emory Law Journal have decided to reject one of the invited
submissions to this present issue, on the ground “that they take issue with your conversation on systematic
racism, finding your words hurtful and unnecessarily divisive. Additionally, there are instances of insensitive
language use throughout the essay.” I have read the offending essay and do not agree with the editors’ decision
to reject it. Some invited contributors, in solidarity with the author whose contribution was rejected, have
protested the decision of the editors by withdrawing their essays. Not wanting to forgo this present opportunity
to honor Professor Perry and his work, I and some other contributors have chosen instead to express our
disagreement with the decision of the editors. If this were an isolated instance of editors rejecting a contribution
for reasons of the sort given, the rejection would be relatively inconsequential. But it is by no means an isolated
instance of such censorship and hence is not without adverse consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
In a good many writings over the course of his distinguished career, Michael
Perry has explored what he calls “the morality of human rights”—by which he
means, to quote him in his most recent writing, Interrogating the Morality of
Human Rights, “the morality embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and/or in one or more of the several international human rights treaties
that have entered into force in the period since the adoption of the Universal
Declaration.”2 Perry describes the writing as the yield of his effort “to present,
in one place my thoughts-and to present the final draft of my thoughts, so to
speak—about the various issues in human rights theory, especially issues
concerning the morality of human rights, that have long been one of my principal
scholarly concerns.”3
In the opening two chapters, Perry presents an interpretation of the
fundamental character of the morality of human rights embodied in the United
Nations (U.N.) declarations.4 Then, in the remaining eight chapters, he explores
a number of applications of that interpretation—how it applies, for example, to
the issues of capital punishment and the legality of same-sex marriage. My
project in this Essay is to engage Perry’s thought in those opening two
chapters—that is, to engage his interpretation of the fundamental character of
the human rights morality of the U.N. declarations.5
Identifying the understanding of human rights embodied in the U.N. human
rights declarations is a challenging undertaking. The 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights does not explain what it understands by the term “human
right,” nor does any other U.N. declaration. The understanding remains implicit.
And as for that implicit understanding, no one would say that the U.N.
declarations are a lucid expression of a well-thought-out understanding of
human rights. That should not come as a surprise. Though there were scholars
on the drafting committees who had thought seriously about the matters under
consideration, there were also activists who had thought more about applications

2
Michael Perry, Interrogating the Morality of Human Rights, intro., 2 (Dec. 5, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (emphasis omitted).
3
Id. at 5.
4
See generally id. (offering an interpretation of the fundamental character of the morality of human
rights).
5
I have benefited from very helpful comments on an earlier version of this Essay by Terence Cuneo,
Ariel Dempsey, and Steven Wykstra.
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than about theory.6 And in any case, as we can now see looking back, discussions
concerning the nature of human rights were then in their infancy.
So, we cannot just pull together what the declarations say to extract a
coherent understanding of human rights. Finding ourselves faced with
statements that do not fit well together, we must decide which to prioritize and
then interpret the others in the light of that decision. Finding ourselves faced
with obscure or ambiguous statements, we interpret those in the light of what is
clear. We practice hermeneutic charity. We might eventually conclude that the
endeavor is hopeless, that not even the most charitable hermeneutic can extract
from the declarations a coherent understanding of human rights. But only as a
last resort will we draw that conclusion.
Perry’s interpretation of the morality of human rights embodied in the U.N.
declarations is highly original; to the best of my knowledge, there is nothing
remotely like it in the literature. I conclude, however, that for a number of
reasons it has to be rejected––one of those reasons being that Perry’s
interpretation implies that human rights are vastly more comprehensive in scope
than those cited as such in the U.N. declarations. I follow my critique of Perry’s
interpretation with a brief presentation of my own interpretation of the human
rights morality of the U.N. declarations.
From what I have said, it will be clear that my engagement with Perry’s
thought will be critical as well as appreciative. That is likely to give some readers
pause. Is it not unseemly, in one’s contribution to a Festschrift, to criticize the
scholarship of the person in whose honor the Festschrift has been assembled?
Not at all! Serious engagement with the line of thought of a fellow scholar is a
way of paying honor, a way of declaring that their thought is worthy of serious
engagement—be the engagement solely appreciative or a blend of appreciation
and critique.
Part I of this Essay will present Perry’s interpretation of the human rights
morality embodied in the U.N. declarations. Part II will pose to Perry’s
interpretation what he himself regards as the most fundamental and challenging
question to be posed to any interpretation—namely, what reason or reasons do
we have to accept, as so interpreted, the human rights morality of the U.N.

6
See generally, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Drafters of the Declaration, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/udhr/drafters-of-the-declaration (last visited May 9, 2022); Mónica
Pinto, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Procedural History, AUDIOVISUAL
LIBR. OF INT’L L., https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/icescr/icescr.html (last visited May 9, 2022) (describing the drafting
history of the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights).
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declarations? Part III will pose some preliminary points of critique of Perry’s
proposal. Part IV will discuss and critique Perry’s claim that the U.N.
declarations imply that certain human rights are possessed by only some human
beings. Part V will discuss and critique his central claim that human rights can
be derived from the mandate to act in a spirit of brotherhood toward everyone.
The last section, Part VI, will briefly present my alternative interpretation of the
human rights morality of the U.N. declarations.
I.

PERRY’S INTERPRETATION OF THE U.N. DECLARATIONS

A striking feature of the Universal Declaration of 1948, and of the U.N.
human rights declarations issued in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,7 is that, with
one exception, in their preamble or opening paragraphs they all refer to “the
inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human family” (or of “[a]ll human
beings,” or “of the human person”).8 Several of them go on to declare that human
rights “derive from” that inherent dignity. The opening clauses of the Preamble
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide an example:
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person . . . .9

The reference to “all human beings” does play a role in Perry’s interpretation,
but the idea of “inherent dignity” does not—in spite of the repeated and emphatic
references in the U.N. declarations to such dignity—and so, of course, the idea
that human rights are “derived from” that inherent dignity also plays no role.
What is it that leads Perry, in his construal of the human rights morality of
the U.N. declarations, to ignore their repeated and emphatic references to

7
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]; G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl. (Dec. 16, 1966);
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl. (Dec. 16,
1966); G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) A, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination pmbl. (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child pmbl. (Nov. 20,
1989); G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec.
18, 1979).
8
See supra note 7. But see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women pmbl. (stating the U.N. “reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person,” but not explicitly identifying that dignity as “inherent”).
9
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, pmbl.

WOLTERSTORFF_6.22.22

2022]

6/23/2022 3:04 PM

INTERPRETING THE UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1669

inherent dignity? Though Perry does not explicitly explain his decision, he
leaves the reader in no doubt as to his reason.
He declares that “the most fundamental—and the most challenging—
question we can ask about the morality of human rights” is this: “What reason
or reasons do we have, if indeed we have any reason, to accept, rather than reject,
the morality of human rights[?]”10 One might have a pragmatic reason for
accepting the morality of human rights; for example, one might accept it in order
to get along with one’s colleagues.11 I interpret Perry as stating “accept” to mean
accept as true. What reason or reasons do we have to accept as true the human
rights morality of the U.N. declarations?
The Universal Declaration of 1948 refers in its preamble to “the inherent
dignity . . . of all members of the human family.”12 Article 1 adds, “All human
beings are . . . equal in dignity.”13 The Declaration gives no reason for its claim
that all human beings have equal inherent dignity; it does not explain what it is
about human beings that accounts for that dignity. The reason for silence on this
point is well known. The drafters of the Declaration found themselves with
intractably different reasons for making the claim, so they decided to remain
silent on the matter.14 They concluded that it was enough for the purposes of the
Declaration to agree that human beings do all have equal inherent dignity; no
need to agree on what it is about them that accounts for that dignity.15
Perry asks whether all human beings do, in fact, have that dignity: “Is there
anything common to each and every human being in virtue of which all human
beings—including newborns, the severely cognitively impaired, homicidal
psychopaths, and so on—have equal inherent dignity?”16 He observes that
theists can point to something common to all human beings in virtue of which
they share that dignity. One common theistic view is that “‘[a]ll human beings
are created in the image of God.’ Another: ‘The special love of the Creator for
each human being “confers upon him or her an infinite dignity.”’”17 But can
nontheists point to some feature shared by all human beings that grounds that dignity?

10

See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 1.
Terence Cuneo, a professor of philosophy at the University of Vermont, called this point to my
attention.
12
UHDR, supra note 7, pmbl.
13
Id. art. 1.
14
Cf. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND
INTENT chs. 1, 8 (Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ed., 2000)
15
See generally id. (discussing the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
16
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 7.
17
Id. at 8.
11
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Perry quotes a passage from the nontheistic philosopher Brian Leiter in
which Leiter says that he sees no such feature.18 Perry concludes that, though no
one has decisively shown that there is no such feature that nontheists can point
to, “[t]here is, to say the least, good reason to be skeptical that there is a plausible
nontheistic answer.”19 But it was the intent of the drafters of the Universal
Declaration that all comers, theists and nontheists alike, would be able to affirm
its claims.20 So, if it turns out that only theists can affirm the equal inherent
dignity claim of the Declaration, then something has gone seriously wrong with
the project, so Perry argues.21 The human rights morality embodied in the
Universal Declaration would prove to be parochially theistic, whereas it was the
intent of the drafters that the declaration enjoy universal acceptance.22
It is at this point that Perry makes his decisive move. He ignores the
references in the declarations to human dignity and, instead, works out the
implications of something else that the Universal Declaration says. Let us have
before us, in its entirety, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration: “All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.”23 Perry’s move is to interpret the human rights morality of the
U.N. human rights documents in light of the first article of the Declaration,
noting that all human beings should “act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.”24 He calls this the grundnorm—the basic norm or underlying
tenet—of the morality of human rights.25 He quotes with approval a
commentator on the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, who claims that “love
is the foundation of human rights.”26
Perry is to be applauded for exploring the possibility of grounding human
rights in the mandate to act in a spirit of brotherhood to everyone. He does not

18

Id. at 9 (quoting Brian Leiter).
Id. at 10; see also NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 177–200 (Terence Cuneo ed., 2012) (arguing there is reason to be skeptical that there is
a possible nontheistic answer to the question of inherent dignity).
20
MORSINK, supra note 14, at 7.
21
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 3.
22
It is worth noting that one might hold that all human beings do have equal inherent dignity while also
being at a loss to explain what it is about them that gives them that dignity. There is nothing irrational about
finding oneself in such a situation. Probably, most people who agree that we have obligations that we have not
voluntarily taken onto ourselves would be at a loss if asked to account for such obligations.
23
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 1.
24
Id.
25
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 1–2.
26
Id. at 15.
19
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deny that human rights can also be grounded in the inherent dignity of all human
beings. He does not declare it to be his view that there is no such dignity. His
reason for exploring an alternative way of grounding human rights is that it
seems likely that nontheists have no reason to accept the idea of every human
being having inherent dignity.27 As they see things, there is nothing about each
and every human being that would account for such dignity.28 But—to repeat—
it was the intent of the drafters of the U.N. declarations that the declarations be
acceptable to theists and nontheists alike.
To the best of my knowledge, Perry’s grundnorm is mentioned nowhere else
in the U.N. declarations. To make it the center of one’s construal of the human
rights morality embodied in the U.N. declarations is not only innovative but also bold.
The Universal Declaration uses the phrase “act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood”29 without explaining how the phrase is to be understood;
neither does Perry offer an explanation. From his discussion, it is clear, however,
how he understands it. We are to treat one another with agapic love—that is,
with the sort of love that seeks to promote or sustain the well-being of the other
individual.30
Perry notes that a morality in which the grundnorm of agapic love is
fundamental “is not just a political morality.”31 He quotes Alexander Lefebvre:
“[C]ontrary to the widespread impression that nation-states are the primary
addressees of human rights documents, [the Universal Declaration] explicitly
name[s] another subject. . . . [T]he principle addressee . . . is not government or
a people; it is, instead, each and every individual person.”32 Perry continues:
“But, although not just a political morality, the morality of human rights is
mainly a political morality, by which I mean a set of norms about how
government . . . should act toward the human beings over whom it (or they)
exercise power.”33 Governments are to act “in a spirit of brotherhood.”34 And
we, as individuals, are “to do what we reasonably can, all things considered, to
get our governments to conduct their affairs—in accord with the norm that

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Perry, supra note 2, chs. 1, 2.
Id. ch. 2, at 11.
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 1.
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 15.
Id. ch.1, at 5.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
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grounds . . . the morality of human rights: to ‘act towards all human beings in a
spirit of brotherhood’ norm.”35
Perry holds that “to say that A has a right that B not do X to A is to say that
B has a duty not to do X to A; to say that A has a right that B do X for A is to
say that B has a duty to do X for A.”36 These are different ways of saying the
same thing. So, for example, to say that Malchus has a right to Michael offering
him a job is the same as saying that Michael has a duty to offer Malchus a job.
What follows from this view of the relationship between duty-talk and
rights-talk is that the grundnorm is also the grundright: the duty of all human
beings to act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood is identical to the right
of all human beings to others acting toward them in a spirit of brotherhood.37 On
Perry’s account, rights are not grounded in some feature of the rights-bearer—
in particular, not grounded in their dignity. Individual rights are applications of
the grundright, that everyone has the right to be treated by others in a spirit of
brotherhood.38
Perry notes that human rights are often said to be rights possessed by all
human beings.39 He quotes the philosopher John Tasioulas as saying that the
“orthodox” meaning of the term “human rights” is “rights possessed by all
human beings simply in virtue of their humanity.”40 Perry disagrees, claiming
that some of the U.N. human rights declarations specify “rights possessed not
by all human beings but only by some: e.g., children, the disabled, (some)
women.”41 He proposes that we instead think of human rights as follows: “[I]if
the fundamental rationale for establishing and protecting the right—for example,
as a treaty-based right—is that conduct that violates the right violates [the
grundnorm to] ‘act toward all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood,’” then it
is a human right.42

35

Id. ch. 2, at 1–2.
Id. ch. 1, at 2.
37
See id. Perry does not use the term “grundright”—that term is my own.
38
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, pmbl. (speaking of human rights
as “derive[d] from the equal inherent dignity of the human person”); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, supra note 7, pmbl. (speaking of human rights as “derive[d] from” the equal inherent dignity
of human beings); see also NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS, 21–43 (2008)
(presenting a right-order in which rights are derived from an objective order of obligations, an account that
contrasts with an inherent rights account).
39
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 4; see also id. ch. 2, at 6 (making reference to the UDHR preamble).
40
Id. ch. 1, at 4.
41
Id. at 4–5.
42
Id. at 5.
36
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II. POSING “THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL AND CHALLENGING QUESTION” TO
PERRY’S PROPOSAL
After articulating his interpretation of the human rights morality of the U.N.
declarations, Perry poses to his interpretation the question that he regards as the
most fundamental and challenging question that can be asked about the morality
of human rights: “What reason or reasons do we have, if indeed we have any
reason, to accept, rather than reject, the morality of human rights?”43
Just as one might have a pragmatic reason for accepting that all human
beings have equal inherent dignity, so one might have a pragmatic reason for
accepting the grundnorm. Let’s state more precisely the question that Perry
presumably has in mind: What reason or reasons do we have for accepting the
grundnorm as binding?
Taking for granted that theists of various stripes might well have such a
reason, Perry presses the question of whether nontheists could as well.44 He
notes that a good many nontheists do in fact “embrace” the norm;45 they are
committed to acting toward others in a spirit of brotherhood. Perry writes that
“[t]he problem of justification persists,” however.46 The “matter-of-fact
[observation] leaves the question of validity intact.”47 Can a nontheist not only
act in accord with the norm, but also have good reason for accepting the norm
as binding?
Perry invites us to imagine a person whose character has been formed in
such a way that she “detest[s] and oppose[s] states of affairs in which any human
being[] suffer[s] grievously in consequence of a law or other policy.”48 Call this
her “sensibility.”49 More specifically, call it her “agapic sensibility”—“an aspect
of [her] particular way of being oriented in the world; more precisely, her
sensibility is a particular way of being oriented to the Other.”50
It is her agapic sensibility, says Perry, that accounts for her acting in a spirit
of brotherhood towards others—not something about the other individual that
calls for respect.51 And if asked “what justifies [your] sensibility, [your] way of
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. ch. 2, at 1.
Id. at 3
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15; see id. at 17 n.41 (describing “agapic sensibility”).
Id. at 16.
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being oriented to the Other,” she has no argument—“nothing to offer” other than
the facts of her sensibility and her experience.52
Perry’s conclusion is that nontheists as well as theists can indeed have good
reason to accept as binding the grundnorm to act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood, and thus, good reason to accept as binding the human rights
morality embodied in the U.N. declarations.53 “Because agape is a prominent
feature of Christian morality, it bears emphasis,” he says:
[O]ne need not be a Christian—or a theist, or a religious believer of
any sort—to have an agapic sensibility. Many of the European nonJews who during the Holocaust, at great risk to themselves and their
families, rescued Jews and others who were strangers to them—were
not theists.54

Perry’s example is curious. After describing the woman that he imagines as
striving to act in accordance with the spirit-of-brotherhood norm, he presses the
questions: What justification might she have for doing so, what reason might she
have for treating the norm as binding?55 The answer he imagines her giving is
that she acts as she does because of her sensibility to suffering.56
But the question being considered was what, if anything, justifies her acting
in accord with the spirit-of-brotherhood norm? What reason does she have, if
any, for regarding the norm as binding? To say that it is her sensibility to
suffering that leads her to act as she does is not to answer that question. And let
it be noted that not all violations of rights involve suffering on the part of the victim.
So far as I can see, Perry, surprisingly, never answers his question as to
whether nontheists could have good reason to accept as binding the mandate to
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
III. SOME PRELIMINARY CRITIQUES OF PERRY’S INTERPRETATION
Before we assess Perry’s construal of the human rights morality embodied
in the U.N. declarations, let me briefly comment on his thesis concerning the
relation between duties and rights, and on the scope of what he calls the grundnorm.

52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 13–14 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 17–18.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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Consider this sentence: A has a duty to do (or not do) X to B if and only if B
has a right that A do (or not do) X to B. Perry holds that the proposition this
sentence expresses is analytically true; the first clause expresses the same
proposition as the second clause.57 This seems to me incorrect.
There is, indeed, a necessary truth in the region. To see what that truth is,
first note that it is plausible to hold that we have duties to things that do not
themselves have rights—animals, for example, or perhaps even works of art. We
can do things to them that we ought not to do, with the result that we are guilty.
But they have not been wronged or deprived of things to which they have a right.
Note, secondly, that there are third-party duties: A’s obligation to B to do soand-so, where “so-and-so” does not name a way of treating B. For example,
consider my promise to Malchus to give a book to Maynard. So, too, there are
third-party rights: B’s right for A to do so-and-so, where “so-and-so” does not
name a way of being treated by B. For example, Malchus’s right to my giving a
book to Maynard. The principle then is this: If B is an entity of the sort that can
be wronged, then A has a duty to B to do (or not do) X if and only if B has a right
that A do (or not do) X. I hold that though this is indeed a necessary truth, it is a
synthetic necessary truth. The two clauses of the biconditional do not express
the same proposition in different words.
Perhaps the best way to see this is to consider the situation when someone
does not treat another as they ought to treat them. The moral condition of the
first person is, then, that they are guilty; the moral condition of the second person
is that they have been wronged. The first person’s being guilty is not the same
as the second person’s being wronged.
The way to think of the situation is as follows. The moral order has two
dimensions, necessarily connected but distinct: (1) the agent-dimension and (2)
the patient- or recipient-dimension. The language of duty and guilt brings to
speech the moral significance of the agent-dimension, the moral significance of
what we do. The language of rights and of being wronged brings to speech the
moral significance of the recipient-dimension, the moral significance of how we
are done-unto. With the language of duty and guilt, an abused spouse can bring
to speech the moral condition of the agent in the situation, A’s abuser: B failed
to do their duty; B is guilty. To bring to speech A’s own moral condition as
recipient of B’s action, A needs the language of rights and being wronged. A was
not treated as A had a right to be treated; A was wronged.

57

Id. ch. 1, at 2
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Perry could, of course, grant this point about the relation between rights and
duties without changing anything of substance in his interpretation of the human
rights morality of the U.N. declarations.
Second, Perry rather often phrases what he calls the grundnorm as “act[ing]
towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.”58 But that’s impossible.
Nobody can act toward all human beings in any way whatsoever. Jesus did not
say, “Love everybody as you love yourself.” He said, “Love your neighbor as
yourself.”59
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration does not say, “All human beings
should act towards everyone in a spirit of brotherhood.” It says, “All human
beings . . . should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”60
Hermeneutic charity requires that we not interpret “one another” as meaning all
human beings.

IV. DO THE U.N. DECLARATIONS REGARD SOME HUMAN RIGHTS AS
POSSESSED BY ONLY SOME HUMAN BEINGS?
The core of Perry’s construal of the human rights morality embodied in the
U.N. rights declarations is his claim that human rights are derived from the
grundnorm to act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. He does not
deny that if human beings possess equal inherent dignity, then human rights can
also be derived from that shared dignity. His claim is only that those rights can
be seen as derivations of that grundnorm.
To assess Perry’s proposal concerning the derivation of human rights, we
must address his interpretation of the U.N. declarations concerning the scope of
human rights. Recall his quoting the philosopher John Tasioulas as saying that
the “orthodox” meaning of the term “human rights” is “rights possessed by all
human beings simply in virtue of their humanity.”61 Perry holds that the
“orthodox” meaning is misinformed. He holds that some of the rights cited by
the U.N. declarations as human rights are not, in fact, possessed by all human
beings. He writes:
58

Id. at 5.
A paraphrase of Matthew 22:39 (King James), “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”
60
See UDHR, supra note 7, art. 1 (emphasis added). Additionally, hermeneutic charity requires that we
also interpret “all human beings” in Article 1 as meaning all human beings capable of acting in a certain way
towards others.
61
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 4 (quoting John Tasioulas, On the Foundations of Human Rights, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 45, 45 (Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao & Massimo Renzo
eds., 2015).
59
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[I]n the context of discourse about international human rights—which
is the principal contemporary discourse about human rights—the
“orthodox” meaning is mistaken: In that context, some human
rights . . . are rights possessed not by all human beings but only by
some: e.g., children, the disabled, (some) women. In what sense is such
a right truly a human right? . . . As the term “human right” is
understood both in the Universal Declaration and in the several
international human rights treaties that have followed in the Universal
Declaration’s wake, a right is a human right, even if according to the
right the rights-holders are not all but only some human beings, if the
fundamental rationale for establishing and protecting the right . . . is
that conduct that violates the right violates the Article 1 norm: “act
towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” The fundamental
rationale for Articles 37 and 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, for example, is that to engage in conduct that violates either
article is to fail to act “in a spirit of brotherhood” toward some human
beings: children.62

Contrary to Perry’s claim concerning the “fundamental rationale” for Articles
37 and 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, these articles do not
mention that (or any other) rationale for the rights they cite. Rather, the rationale
for the rights they cite, and for all the others cited in the Convention, is given in
the Preamble to the Convention. The Preamble opens with these familiar words:
“Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter
of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”63 Though the Preamble does not
declare that the rights cited in the Convention are derived from the inherent
dignity of all members of the human family, clearly that is the suggestion.
Derived not from the mandate to act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood, including towards children, but rather derived from the inherent
dignity of everyone, including children. Acting in a spirit of brotherhood is
nowhere mentioned in the Convention.
Now, let us address Perry’s claim that some of the rights cited by the U.N.
declarations as human rights are possessed by only some human beings.64 Some
of them, he says, are rights distinctive of certain subsets of human beings, such
as “children, the disabled, and (some) women.”65 For a reason that will become
clear shortly, let me formulate Perry’s claim this way: some of the rights cited
62
63
64
65

Id. at 4–5.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, pmbl.
See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 5.
Id.
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by the U.N. declarations as human rights are possessed by only some human
beings or persons, not by all human beings or persons. Is this claim correct?
With one exception, all the U.N. rights declarations issued in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s employ the concept of human rights in their preamble or
opening paragraphs, and they all do so in such a way as to suggest that the rights
to be cited in the declarations that follow are human rights.
The exception is the Convention on the Rights of the Child.66 In the case of
this declaration, the rights cited are clearly the distinctive rights of a particular
sub-set of human beings or persons; viz., children. The Declaration does not,
however, suggest that these are human rights. Though it, like all the other
declarations of the time, does employ the concept of human rights in its
preamble, it does not do so in such a way as to suggest that the rights to be cited
in the text that follows are human rights.67
The title of another declaration, “Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women,” might lead one to expect that it, too,
is an exception—that the rights it cites are those distinctive of a particular subset
of human beings or persons: namely, women. But not so. Though the convention
does focus on the rights of women, the rights it cites are, with one exception, not
rights distinctive of women but rights shared by women and men alike.68
So, once again: Is the term “human rights” understood in the U.N.
declarations in such a way that some human rights are possessed by only some
human beings or persons? Pervasive in the documents are the terms “everyone,”
“no one,” “all persons,” “every human being.” May it nonetheless be the case,
as Perry suggests, that when we look at the rights that are actually cited in what
is presented as a list of human rights, we are forced to conclude that the
documents do not in fact think of all human rights as possessed by all who are
human beings or persons?
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does single out
certain rights distinctive of mothers and children, and Article 26 of the Universal

66
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7. The Convention against Torture does not use
the term “human rights.” But it does refer to “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family.” And that is clearly the same concept, in other words, as the concept of human rights. G.A. Res. 39/46,
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pmbl. (Dec. 10,
1984).
67
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, pmbl.
68
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 7.
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Declaration singles out a right distinctive of parents.69 Is this sufficient reason
for drawing Perry’s conclusion as to the scope of what the U.N. declarations
regard as human rights?
I think not. Article 25 has two parts. The first part reads, “Everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family.”70 The second part then reads, “Motherhood and childhood
are entitled to special care and assistance.”71 I think it would be a serious overinterpretation to construe this latter sentence as an indication that the drafters
understood the term “human rights” along Perry’s lines. I suggest that it is most
plausibly understood as a parenthetical comment.
So, too, for Article 26. The article has three parts. The first part begins,
“Everyone has the right to education.”72 The third part then reads, “Parents have
a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their
children.”73 I suggest that this latter sentence is also most plausibly construed
not as an indication that the drafters understood the term “human rights” along
Perry’s lines, but rather as a parenthetical comment.
A number of other articles in the Declaration are to be understood along the
same lines, namely, as parenthetical comments concerning rights distinctive to
a certain subset of human persons.74
V. ASSESSING PERRY’S PROPOSED DERIVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Governments, says Perry, are mandated by Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration to act in a spirit of brotherhood toward all those over whom they
exercise power; and he suggests that the understanding of human rights implicit
in the U.N. declarations is that it is those rights that governments should secure
by laws, treaties, and administrative regulations and decisions.75
Are these claims true? Can the U.N. declarations be interpreted as stating or
implying this to be the mandate for government? And can the declarations be
interpreted as working with this as their implicit understanding of human rights?

69
70
71
72
73
74
75

UDHR, supra note 7, arts. 25, 26.
Id. art. 25.
Id.
Id. art. 26.
Id.
See, e.g., id. arts. 11, 14, 25.
Perry, supra note 2, ch. 1, at 5–6.
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Can human rights be seen as derived, in the way Perry suggests, from the spiritof-brotherhood mandate?
What contributes to someone’s well-being differs greatly among human
beings and changes significantly over an individual’s lifetime. If government is
to act in a spirit of brotherhood toward all those over whom it exercises power,
then it will have to differentiate correspondingly in how it treats its subjects.
One surmises that Perry discerned this implication of his proposal and that
it was this, in part, that led him to interpret the U.N. declarations as regarding
some of the rights distinctive of such subsets of human beings as children, the
disabled, and new mothers as human rights. We have cast doubt on this
interpretation of the U.N. declarations. But notice, now, that if this were the
declarations’ implicit understanding of human rights, not only would there be
human rights distinctive of children but also human rights distinctive of one type
of child, human rights distinctive of another type of child, human rights
distinctive of a third type of child, and so forth. For not only do human beings
in general differ greatly with respect to what contributes to their well-being;
children also differ greatly, as do the disabled, women, and so forth.
In short, the rights purportedly derived from the spirit-of-brotherhood
mandate are vastly more numerous than those cited as human rights by the U.N.
declarations and described as derived from the equal inherent dignity that the
declarations attribute to all individuals. Perry has not articulated an alternative
way of deriving distinctively human rights.
Another point worth noting is that, should a government attempt to act in
accord with the spirit-of-brotherhood mandate, it would find itself unavoidably
compelled to violate some of the rights derived from that mandate. Consider the
following example. A new highway is proposed. There is general agreement that
the highway would be a great boon to residents of the area. But the highway, as
proposed, would go through a farm owned by the same family for generations.
The present owners refuse to sell. They go to court to try to stop the project.
They lose. The farm is taken by eminent domain. The spirit-of-brotherhood
mandate implies that the family has the right, vis a vis the government, to the
government promoting their well-being. In promoting the well-being of most
people in the area, the government has violated their right.
Governments cannot promote the well-being of all their subjects equally;
they have to establish priorities, promoting the well-being of some more than
that of others, often even finding themselves in the unfortunate position of having
to diminish the well-being of some in order to promote the well-being of others.
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VI. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS MORALITY
OF THE U.N. DECLARATIONS
Recall Perry’s reason for embarking on his novel construal of the human
rights morality of the U.N. declarations. After taking note of the fact that the
declarations refer emphatically and repeatedly to the equal inherent dignity of
all members of the human family and claim that human rights are derived from
that dignity, he asked whether nontheists can have a reason for affirming the
claim that all human beings, no matter how impaired they may be, have equal
inherent dignity.76 Or to put what I understand to be Perry’s question in different
words: can nontheists hold that there is something about each and every human
being that gives them equal inherent dignity? The relevance of the question is
that it was the intent of the drafters of the declarations that non-religious as well
as religious people would be able to affirm the declarations.
Perry observed that, so far as he could see, it’s unlikely that nontheists could
have a reason for affirming the claim that all human beings have equal inherent
dignity.77 Perry quoted the nontheistic philosopher Brian Leiter as being of the
same opinion.78 It was this view that led Perry to explore a way of construing
the human rights morality of the declarations that did not appeal to the idea of
equal inherent dignity—or, indeed, to dignity of any sort. Let us take up Perry’s
challenge and offer a dignity-based construal of the human rights morality of the
U.N. declarations that nontheists as well as theists can affirm.
Begin by posing a question different from Perry’s—one aimed at the claim
of most of the declarations, that all human beings have equal inherent dignity
and that the rights cited in those declarations derive from that dignity. Let us ask
whether the rights cited in the documents are in fact possessed by “all members
of the human family” and whether they can all be seen as derived from that
shared dignity.79
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration declares, “Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and the security of person.”80 Let us grant that all members of the
human family do possess this right, vague though it is, including those who are
seriously impaired and those who are not, and that they possess the right in virtue
of simply being human. All one needs, to possess the right, is to be human; one
76

See Perry, supra note 2, ch. 2, at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
78
Id. at 9.
79
See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7 (listing rights that are obviously not
shared by all individuals).
80
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 3.
77
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need not be any particular kind of human being. Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration declares, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment.”81 Let us grant that all members of the human family
also possess this right and that they do so in virtue of simply being human.
But now consider Article 27: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits.”82 Those who possess this right do not possess it
in virtue of simply being human; they possess it in virtue of being a human
person. Those who are not persons do not possess this right: newborn infants do
not, nor do those sunk deep into dementia and those in a permanent coma. The
reason they do not possess the right is that they are incapable of participating in
the cultural life of the community. Talk about rights would run seriously amok
if we attributed to individuals the right to do things that they are incapable of doing.
The U.N. human rights declarations interchangeably use the terms “human
person,” “human being,” and “member of the human family.” For example, the
opening sentence of the Preamble of the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights speaks of “the inherent dignity . . . of all members of the human
family.”83 The next sentence then speaks of “the inherent dignity of the human
person.” I submit that the terms are not synonymous. A fundamental fact about
human beings is that not all human beings are persons—that is, not all are
capable of performing the functions definitive of personhood. Those sunk deep
into dementia are not capable of doing so, nor are those in a permanent coma.
An individual can lose his or her personhood while remaining a human being.
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration suggests, without actually
saying, that the rights to be cited are derived from the inherent dignity of “all
members of the human family.”84 But when we look at the rights that are actually
cited, we see that although some are indeed derived from the inherent dignity
that one has in virtue just of being a human being (a member of the human
family)—again, assuming that there is such dignity—most are instead derived
from the inherent dignity that one has in virtue of being a human person.

81

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 27.
83
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7, pmbl.
84
See id.; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7, pmbl.
(identifying that the rights cited in the covenant are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person—not
the inherent dignity of the human being).
82
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It is one of the most fraught imprecisions of the U.N. declarations that they
do not distinguish between “a human being” and “a human person.” But given
that they do not, I suggest another way to interpret the concept of human rights
implicit in the Universal Declaration and subsequent U.N. human rights
declarations. A right that one has is a human right if one has the right in virtue
of possessing the inherent dignity of being a human person or that of being a
human being.
In contrast to Perry’s interpretation, this interpretation honors the repeated
and emphatic statement of the U.N. declarations that human rights are grounded
in the inherent dignity of the rights-bearers. It requires, however, that we
interpret the Universal Declaration as speaking loosely when it suggests that
human rights are those derived from the inherent dignity of all members of the
human family, and that we likewise interpret subsequent declarations as
speaking loosely when they suggest that human rights are those derived from the
inherent dignity of the human person. Human rights are those derived from the
inherent dignity that we have as human persons or as human beings.
Now, for an adaptation of the question that Perry described as the most
fundamental and challenging question that can be put to an interpretation of what
he calls “the morality of human rights”: Could nontheists agree with theists that
there are individuals who possess the inherent dignity of being a human person
or a human being? And could they, accordingly, agree with theists that there are
rights derived from that dignity?
They could indeed. Consider, once again, the right to life, liberty, and
security of the person cited in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration.85
Nontheists can join theists in affirming that there is this right and that it is derived
from the inherent dignity that an individual has by virtue of being a human
person or a human being. All the other rights cited as “human rights” in the U.N.
declarations are so, too, derived. Human rights are those derived from the
inherent dignity one has as a human being or a human person.
To return to the main point, we do not have to give up on a dignity
interpretation of the human rights morality embodied in the U.N. declarations
because some of our fellows do not believe that all human beings have inherent
dignity. Enough if they agree that all human persons or human beings have
inherent dignity. Human rights are derived from that dignity.

85

UDHR, supra note 7, art. 3.

WOLTERSTORFF_6.22.22

1684

6/23/2022 3:04 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1665

Of course, though nontheists can readily join theists in affirming that there
is the inherent dignity of being a human person or a human being, many of them
are likely to refrain from affirming that merely being a human being—not a
human person but a human being—bestows any dignity on an individual. If so,
they will then disagree with theists as to the scope of the right to life, liberty, and
security that, nontheists agree, is derived from the dignity that an individual has
in virtue of being a human person and/or a human being. Nontheists will doubt
or deny that those human beings who are not persons have that right. To quote
once more Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of person.”86 Nontheists will disagree with theists on the
scope of the term “everyone.” Theists will take it to mean “every human being.”
Nontheists will take it to mean “every human person.”87
An important point of interpretation remains to be addressed. It is in virtue
of being a human person, not just a human being, that one has the right to
participate in the cultural life of one’s community. But there are human persons
who are disabled or handicapped in such a way that they cannot participate in
the cultural life of their community. What does this imply? Does it imply that
those persons do not have those rights of participation? Or does it imply, rather,
that they do have those rights and that we were mistaken in the claim we made
earlier that one does not have the right to do something that one is incapable of doing?
The answer is neither. I suggest that when the Universal Declaration states,
“Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community,”88
this is most plausibly interpreted as meaning that all persons have the right to
participate in the cultural life of the community if able.89 All human persons
have that conditional right, and they have it in virtue of being a human person.
It is a human right. So, too, for the statement in Article 23 of the Universal
Declaration that “[e]veryone has the right to work.”90 This is most plausibly

86

Id.
See NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 177 (Terence Cuneo ed., 2012). In my essay, On Secular and Theistic Groundings of Human
Rights, I develop a theistic account of what it is about being human that gives us dignity. NICHOLAS
WOLTERSTORFF, On Secular and Theistic Groundings of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, supra, at 177–200. In my essay, Grounding the Rights We Have as Human Persons, I develop a
non-theistic account of what it is about being a human person that gives us dignity. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF,
Grounding the Rights We Have as Human Persons, in UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra, at 201–
26.
88
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 27.
89
This interpretation was suggested to me by Steve Wykstra. Stephen Wykstra is retired from teaching
philosophy at Calvin University, where he and I overlapped for a good many years.
90
UDHR, supra note 7, art. 23.
87
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interpreted as meaning that all persons have the right to work if able. And this is
true, also, for many, perhaps most, of the other rights of persons cited in the U.N.
human rights declarations. They are conditional rights that an individual has in
virtue of possessing the inherent dignity of being a human person.
CONCLUSION
The bulk of this Essay has been devoted to engaging the interpretation of the
human rights morality embodied in the U.N. declarations that Michael Perry
articulates in his recent writing, Interpreting the Morality of Human Rights.
Perry’s interpretation is both novel and challenging, deserving of careful
consideration. I conclude, however, that it proves ultimately unsuccessful; in
response, I have offered my own, more traditional interpretation of the morality
of human rights as intended by the U.N. declarations.

